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INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, the countries of the European Union seemed ready
to allow Syrian refugees to cross into their borders. Prime Minister David
Cameron said that the United Kingdom had a "moral responsibility" to refugees
t Yale Law School, J.D. 2017. I'm grateful to Professor Oona Hathaway for her thoughtful
guidance and supervision of this research. Many thanks as well to Hope Metcalf and Gregory Cui for
their comments on early versions of this Note, and to my parents for their constant support not only of
this project but of my entire academic career. For their wonderful feedback and endless patience, I'd
also like to thank Arjun Ramamurti, Valerie Comenencia Ortiz, and the rest of the YJIL editing staff.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42: 185
and that the country would accept 20,000 refugees by 2020.' German Vice-
Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel announced the next day that his country could
accept half a million asylum seekers each year for several years. 2
But on November 13, 2015, 130 people were killed in Paris in a terrorist
attack for which ISIS claimed responsibility.' The debate about whether one of
the attackers might have been a Syrian refugee was instantaneous and heated.'
The next day a top German politician posted on Twitter: "#parisattacks change
everything. We cannot allow any illegal and uncontrolled immigration."' The
governors of Bavaria and Saxony immediately called for tighter border
controls.6 Europe backed up its threats with actions. Later that same month,
Turkey and the European Union passed a new agreement, according to which
Europe provided the funding for Turkey's increased border security, in return
for Turkey's pledge to stop more refugees before they arrived on European
shores.'
Europe reeled over the next year as the Paris attacks were followed with
the Brussels airport bombings, the Bastille Day truck rampage in Nice, and a
late summer church shooting in Normandy.8 In response, the rhetoric and
actions aimed at Syrian refugees escalated. In March 2016, the European Union
("EU") and Turkey announced a new policy to curb "illegal migration." 9 Under
its terms, "[i]n order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer
migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk," all "new irregular
migrants" who crossed from Turkey into Greece would be returned to Turkey;
for each individual so returned, "another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey
to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria." 0 In the spring of
2016, European leaders pushed for" and eventually received 2 an expansion of
1. See UK to Accept 20,000 Refugees from Syria by 2020, BBC (Sept. 7, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34171148.
2. See Migrant Crisis: Germany 'Can Take 500,000 Asylum Seekers a Year', BBC (Sept. 8,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34185353.
3. See Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks "First of the
Storm," N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-
responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miraces.html.
4. See, e.g., Ishaan Tharoor, Were Syrian Refugees Involved in the Paris Attacks? What We
Know and Don't Know, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/17/were-syrian-refugees-involved-in-
the-paris-attacks-what-we-know-and-dont-know.
5. See Anton Troianovski, Paris Attacks May Unsettle EUs Debate on Migration, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.comL/articles/paris-attacks-may-unsettle-eus-debate-on-migration-
1447510975.
6. Id.
7. Valentina Pop, EU To Pay $3 Billion for Turkey's Help in Stemming Migrant Crisis,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-leaders-approve-migrant-trust-fund-for-
africa-but-divisions-remain-1447327556.
8. See, e.g., Alice Foster, Terror Attacks Timeline: From Paris and Brussels Terror to Most
Recent Attacks in Europe, SUNDAY ExPRESS (July 27, 2016), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world
/693421 /Terror-attacks-timeline-France-Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism.
9. Press Release, EU-Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu
/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement.
10. Id.
11. Rowena Mason & Patrick Kingsley, David Cameron: Send More Patrol Ships To Turn
Refugee Boats back to Libya, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016
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Operation Sophia, the EU naval operation designed to intercept and return
refugees and other migrants being smuggled between Libya and Europe. By
2016, European countries had surrounded themselves with 1,200 kilometers of
fences-mostly begun in 2015 amidst growing political furor about refugees
and migrants-and had even more fences in the works.' 3 Hungary's notoriously
anti-immigrant prime minister declared its expanded fence was necessary
because "[i]mmigration and migrants . . . are a threat to people and bring
terrorism upon us."' 4
The threat so many Europeans are hoping to keep out is a refugee
population. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
"characterizes the flight of civilians from Syria as a refugee movement" and
"considers that most Syrians seeking international protection are likely to fulfil
the requirements of the refugee definition contained in Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees."" And once Syrian
refugees have entered EU territory or arrived at its borders, they are, at least
occasionally, afforded protections owed to refugees. EU courts actively review
refugees' asylum claims, sometimes overruling government recommendations
in issuing decisions that forbid removal.' 6 But Syrian refugees who cannot get
to Europe cannot access those protections-and access is now made difficult
indeed.
Europe is not alone in this attitude. Many politicians in the United States
have made clear that they would have the United States follow Europe's
example, precisely because of the security concerns refugees supposedly raise.
The week after the Paris attacks, thirty-one governors publicly declared that
Syrian refugees were not welcome in their states.' 7 Greg Abbott, governor of
Texas, wrote in a letter to President Obama, "Given the tragic attack in Paris
and the threats we have already seen in Texas . . . Texas cannot participate in
any program that will result in Syrian refugees-any one of whom could be
/mar/1 8/refugee-boats-david-cameron-early-intervention-libya-migrants-mediterranean-eu-leaders.
12. Press Release, European Council, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: Mandate




20Sophia% 3 A% 2 0
mandate%20extended%20by%/o20one%20yeal/o2C%20two%20new/o20tasks%20added.
13. See Gabriela Baczynska & Sara Ledwith, How Europe Built Fences To Keep People Out,
REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-fences-insight-
idUSKCN0XIOU7; Lizzie Dearden, Hungary Planning "Massive" New Border Fence To Keep Out
Refugees as PM Vows To "Hold Them Back by Force," INDEPENDENT (Aug. 27, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/hungary-massive-new-border-fence-to-keep-out-
refugees-prime-minister-orban-turkey-eu-hold-them-back-a7212696.html.
14. Dearden, supra note 13.
15. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, International Protection Considerations with Regard to
People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update III, In 21, 26 (Oct. 2014).
16. See, e.g., L.M. & Others v. Russia, App. No. 40081/14 (Eur. Ct. H.R Oct. 15, 2015); see
also M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 2011) (protecting non-
Syrian refugees from deportation).
17. See Ashley Fantz & Ben Brumfield, More Than Halfthe Nation's Governors Say Syrian
Refugees Not Welcome, CNN (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/l l/16/world/paris-attacks-
syrian-refugees-backlash.
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connected to terrorism-being resettled in Texas."18 On November 19, 2015,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill titled the "American Security
Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015."19 What sounds like a declaration of war
was designed "[lt]o require that supplemental certifications and background
investigations be completed prior to the admission of certain aliens as
refugees." 20 In the words of presidential candidate Marco Rubio, "[W]e won't
be able to take more refugees. It's not that we don't want to, it's that we can't.
Because there's no way to background check someone that's coming from
Syria." 21 Donald Trump won the November 2016 presidential election after
campaigning for "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States"22-which would include most Syrians. 23 President Trump's
official justification for the policy centered on the security threat from Muslim
immigrants: "Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and
the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims [sic] of
horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of
reason or respect for human life." 24
Nor are these none-shall-pass systems unique to Syrian refugees. 25
President Trump's other famous campaign pledge on immigration was to build
a wall at the United States' southern border to keep out all migrants, including
refugees.26 His predecessor in office, Barack Obama, signed off on other, albeit
less blatant, refugee-blocking plans. When the United States was faced with a
daunting Central American refugee crisis in 2014, it outsourced much of the
work of intercepting refugees to Mexico. The Southern Border Plan, which the
New York Times called a "ferocious crackdown on refugees fleeing violence in
Central America," 27 has operated to fortify Mexico's southern border against
refugees from the Northern Triangle. According to one advocacy group, "U.S.
assistance has thus far been focused on equipment deliveries, such as US $6.6
million for Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment and US $3.5 million for
biometric kiosks and training for Mexican military forces involved in border
18. Letter from Greg Abbott, Governor of Tex., to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (Nov.
16, 2015), http://gov.texas.gov/files/press-office/SyrianRefugeesBarackObamal 1162015.pdf.
19. H.R. 4038, 114th Cong. (2015).
20. Id.
21. John McCormick, Rubio: U.S. Can't Take More Syrian Refugees, WKLY. STANDARD
(Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/rubio-u.s.-cant-take-more-syrian-
refugees/article/1064381.
22. Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim immigration, DONALD J. TRUMP (Dec.
7, 2015), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-
muslim-immigration.
23. According to the CIA World Factbook, 87% of Syrians are Muslim. See The World
Factbook: Syria, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sy.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
24. Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, supra note 22.
25. For a catalog of admission-thwarting policies enacted over the last twenty years, see
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative
Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 248-58 (2015).
26. Immigration, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/immigration
(last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
27. Sonia Nazario, The Refugees at Our Door, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/1 1/opinion/sunday/the-refugees-at-our-door.html.
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security operations." 28 The plan's goal is simple. In the words of the Chairman
of the House Homeland Security Committee, "If we can close the southern
border of Mexico, that stops 99 percent of our problems here." 29 Similarly,
Australia has come under heavy international criticism for its "Stop the Boats"
policy, under which boats carrying refugees from Asia and the Pacific are
stopped in international waters and escorted to Papua New Guinea or other
Pacific islands, where the refugees are placed in indefinite detention.3 0 Tony
Abbott, Australia's prime minister from 2013 to 2015, maintained the refugees
were a "challenge to our national security" and that his government was right to
put aside "moral posturing" in crafting its response.31
While national security is not the only rationale for programs like the EU-
Turkey deal, Operation Sophia, the Southern Border Plan, and Stop the Boats,
it is clearly a central concern for many of these policymakers. In the modem,
security-conscious era, public dialogue around refugee resettlement-both for32
and against33-is intrinsically linked to issues of national security. Allowing
refugees to cross borders is portrayed as a balancing act. On the one hand,
governments express a real willingness to help in moments of humanitarian
crisis. 34 On the other hand, officials live in fear of being the one who lets the
architect of the next major terrorist attack enter the country.
This balancing act plays out in international law as well as international
policy debates. Non-refoulement, the widely accepted international legal
principle that refugees cannot be returned to countries where they face
persecution, sits in constant tension with another widely accepted principle:
Every state has the right to police its borders and to deny entry to anyone who
threatens the security of that state. The text of the Refugee Convention itself
points to this tension. The sole textual exception to non-refoulement grants host
countries permission to expel refugees who pose security risks.35
28. Clay Boggs, Five Questions About Mexico 's New Southern Border Program, WOLA
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.wola.org/commentary/five-questions aboumexicos_newsouthern
.border-program.
29. Unaccompanied Minors: Hearings Before the H. Comm. On Homeland Sec., 113th Cong.
(2015) (statement of Rep. Michael McCaul), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
I l3hhrg9l929/html/CHRG-l I 3hhrg91929.htm.
30. See HRC Communication No. 2094/2011, CCPR/C/108/D/2094/2011 (Oct. 28, 2013);
Editorial, Australia's Brutal Treatment of Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/opinion/australias-brutal-treatment-of-migrants.html.
31. Tony Abbott, Abbott: I Was Right on National Security, QUADRANT ONLINE (Mar. 26,
2016), https:/quadrant.org.au/opinion/qed/2016/03/abbott-right-national-security.
32. See, e.g., David Mednicoff, More Syrian Refugees: Good for National Security,
CONVERSATION (Sept. 10, 2015), https://theconversation.com/more-syrian-refugees-good-for-national-
security-47347.
33. Ben Riley-Smith, Thousands of ISIL Fighters Could Use Migrant Crisis to "Flood" into
Europe, Nigel Forage Warns, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics
/nigel-farage/l l844290/Thousands-of-Isil-fighters-could-use-migrant-crisis-to-flood-into-Europe-Nigel-
Farage-wams.html.
34. As President Obama put it, "Many of these refugees are the victims of terrorism
themselves, that's what they're fleeing. Slamming the door in their faces would be a betrayal of our
values." Editorial, After Paris Attacks, Vilifying Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/Il/17/opinion/after-paris-attacks-vilifying-refugees.htmi.
35. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Concern about threats to national security has naturally increased in the
years since September 11, 2001, and increased again in the wake of attacks like
those in France and Belgium. With such increased concern comes an increased
will to use all legal tools available to minimize perceived security risks. This
Note enters the fray to explain that the national security exception to non-
refoulement is not such a tool. 36 To the contrary, when destination countries
invoke national security rationales to deny refugees entrance, they violate
international law. Security-centered responses amount to what international
legal scholars have described as a policy of non-entree: "The refugee shall not
access our community." 37
This Note uses Europe's response to Syrian refugees as a case study to
showcase the way overly broad interpretations of national security provisions in
international refugee law are invoked to create systems that deny refugees the
opportunity to enter their destination countries. Through an in-depth analysis of
the text, preparatory materials, and early practice of the Refugee Convention,
this Note demonstrates that these national-security-based non-entrie systems
do not adhere to the narrow intended meaning of the security exception to non-
refoulement. Rather, overly capacious readings of the national security
exception violate the principle of non-refoulement and may be challenged
under international law.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the principle of non-
refoulement and its accompanying national security exception, and describes
the contours of the systems of exclusion that provide the case study for this
Note. After showing that the treaty language governing non-entrde regimes is
ambiguous, Part II provides a thorough exercise in treaty interpretation,
analyzing the sources relevant to the Refugee Convention to explain the
contours of the non-refoulement obligation and the accompanying obligation to
admit. Part III returns to the situation of Syrian refugees, explaining how their
exclusion from the European Union could be challenged as a matter of
international law.
I. THE BLURRED LINE BETWEEN ADMISSION AND RETURN: NON-REFOULEMENT
AND NON-ENTRtE
The countries of the European Union-like the United States and
Australia-have ratified and are bound by the terms of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).3 8 They are forbidden
36. To date, politicians and policymakers have justified non-admission policies with reference
to the general idea of protecting national security, see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text, but
have not specifically invoked the national security exception in Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention. This Note anticipates that their legal advisors may believe or come to believe that the
exception provides legal cover for their actions.
37. James C. Hathaway, The Emerging Politics ofNon-Entr6e, 91 REFUGEES 40, 40-41
(1992). The term non-entrge was first used in this article.
38. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. Australia and all members of
the European Union have ratified both the Convention and the Protocol. The United States has ratified
the Protocol only, which incorporates the Convention by reference. See Convention Relating to the
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to expel or return any refugee to a country where she faces persecution unless
she poses a threat to the security of the country where she seeks refuge. This
Part first describes the breadth of the prohibition on return and then explains
how national-security-based non-entree policies appear, at least at first glance,
to avoid triggering such a prohibition.
A. Non-Refoulement and Its National Security Exception
The principle of non-refoulement is the core tenet of the Refugee
Convention and the accompanying 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. 39 Article 33 states: "No Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." 40
According to the UNHCR, the "principle of non-refoulement is the
cornerstone of asylum and of international refugee law."4 1 Non-refoulement is
incorporated, either explicitly or by later interpretation, into many other human
rights instruments, including, among others, the Convention Against Torture,42
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,43 the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union," and the American Convention on
Human Rights.4 5 Non-refoulement is now so firmly established that legal
scholars 46 and international courts 47 have argued for many years that it has
attained the status of customary international law because it is "accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter Status of the Refugee Convention],
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no-V-5&chapter-5&lang-en.
39. Refugee Convention, supra note 38, arts. 33(1)-(2); see also Refugee Protocol, supra note
38, art. 1.
40. Refugee Convention, supra note 38, art. 33(1).
41. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNCHR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement
(Nov. 1997), http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html; see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,
Introductory Note, Convention Relating to the Status of Refigees, AuDiovisuAL LIBRARY INT'L L.,
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html; Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High
Commissioner), UNHCR, EC/SCP/2, ¶ 1 (Aug. 23, 1977), http://www.unher.org/3ae68cedl0.html.
42. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
43. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), U.N. Doc.
HRt/GEN/1/Rev.9, 9 (Mar. 10, 1992).
44. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 19, 2000 OJ. (C 364) 1.
45. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 22(7),
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
46. See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature ofNon-Refoulement, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 533
(2001); see also Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 69 (1983); Alice
Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures That Threaten Refugee
Protection, 23 GEO. [MMIGR. L.J. I (2008); Arthur C. Helton, Asylum and Refugee Protection in
Thailand, I INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 20 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of
International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 221 (Aug. 19, 2014),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_2 1eng.pdf.
2017] 191
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42: 185
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." 48
In the text of the Refugee Convention, non-refoulement is subject to one
major exception:
(2) The benefit of the present provision ["Prohibition of Expulsion or Return
('Refoulement')] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.4 9
As interpreted by the UNHCR, this exception is narrow. Article 33(2)
"should be applied with the greatest caution. It is necessary to take fully into
account all the circumstances of the case and, where the refugee has been
convicted of a serious criminal offence, to any mitigating factors and the
possibilities of rehabilitation and reintegration within society."" Moreover,
"[N]ational security exceptions to non-refoulement are not appropriate in local
or isolated threats to law and order."15 But in a world where more and more
immigrants and refugees are being labeled terrorists or threats to national
security,52 a moment's thought suffices to engender the serious worry that
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention). According to the UNHCR, non-refoulement has in fact attained the
status of customary international law: "[T]he principle of non-refoulement is universally recognized
[such that] States that have not yet acceded to [the Convention and Protocol] should nevertheless apply
the principle of non-refoulement in view of its universal acceptance and fundamental humanitarian
importance." Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner), supra note 41, T 18; see
also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf. The 2001 declaration of states party to
the Convention and Protocol acknowledging the "core... principle of non-refoulement, whose
applicability is embedded in customary international law" provides strong support for this view.
Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, ¶ 4, UN Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/419c74d64.pdf.
But not all commentators agree. One respected scholar of international refugee law has stated strongly
that "just because most countries have accepted some kind of non-refoulement obligation, applying to at
least some kinds of cases, and in at least some contexts," it cannot be concluded that non-refoulement is
a universal duty. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 365
(2005). For the purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to resolve this debate. It is enough to note that
even among those who resist applying the jus cogens label to non-refoulement, the principle is
nonetheless widely respected and vehemently defended.
49. Refugee Convention, supra note 38, art. 33(2). The entire Convention has a similar
exception, in Article IF, excluding those convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity from
refugee status. Refugee Convention, supra note 38, art. IF. As the application of the exclusion clauses is
not specific to non-refoulement, a full examination of them is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it
should be noted that these clauses have been and continue to be used in a manner that parallels the
invocation of the national security exception. See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, Note on the
Exclusion Clauses, EC/47/SC/CRP.29 ¶ 5 (May 30, 1997), http://www.unher.org/3ae68cf68.html;
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Position on Exclusion from Refugee Status,
PPl/03/2004/Ext/CA, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 257 (2004); William Thomas Worster, The Evolving
Definition ofthe Refugee in Contemporary International Law, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 94 (2012).
50. Note on Non-Refoulement, supra note 41, ¶ 14; see also UNHCR Note on the Principle of
Non-Refoulement, supra note 41 (using the same language).
51. UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, supra note 41.
52. See Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control,
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1827 (2007); Donald Kerwin, The Use and Misuse of
"National Security" Rationale in Crafting US. Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 749 (2005).
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"[t]hese exceptions have the potential to gut non-refoulement and leave
refugees vulnerable to violations of underlying human rights." 53
B. The Theory ofNon-Entrie
The term non-entrie was coined in 1992 to describe increasingly common
practices under which refugees were not technically returned (which would
constitute refoulement), but were instead systematically refused entry into their
destination countries.54 While the term has yet to be firmly defined, it has
become understood to encompass a large variety of "strategies specifically
designed to discourage and sometimes prevent would-be asylum seekers from
accessing their asylum and other refugee status determination processes." 5
Phil Orchard has pinned the development of the non-entrie "regime" to
the end of the Cold War.56 By the early 1990s, not only had numbers of
refugees begun rising dramatically, but the types of refugees also began to
change; most refugees were no longer anti-communist dissidents who fit neatly
into the Refugee Convention's definitions-nor were they white or European.57
The national security-based non-entr6e policies at issue in this Note belong to a
universe of similar regimes by which sophisticated states in the Global North
have created complex interdependent webs of policies that serve to deny
admission to distant refugees.58
Among the most concerning non-entr6e programs-and the type at issue
in this Note-are the so-called "'interception' programs."" In a 2000 paper, the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR acknowledged that there was no
internationally accepted definition even of "interception," but put forth a
working definition:
For the purpose of this paper, interception is defined as encompassing all measures
applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop
the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international
borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective
destination.60
While that Executive Committee paper stopped short of declaring that
interception is necessarily a form of refoulement, it emphasized that
interception increases the risk of indirect refoulement, that is, the "removal of a
refugee from one country to a third country which will subsequently send the
refugee onward to the place of feared persecution . . . , for which several
53. Alice Farmer, supra note 46, at 2 (referring to both the IF and the 33(2) exceptions).
54. See Hathaway, supra note 37, at 4041.
55. Stephen H. Legomsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program, 18 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 677, 677 (2006).
56. PiHlL ORCHARD, A RIGHT TO FLEE: REFUGEES, STATES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 203-29 (2014).
57. Id.
58. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 25, at 248-57.
59. Legomsky, supra note 55, at 678.
60. Exec. Comm. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Interception ofAsylum-Seekers and
Refugees: The International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, U.N.
Doc. No. EC/60/SC/CRP. 17, 1 10 (June 9, 2000), http://www.unhcr.org/4aa660c69.pdf.
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countries may bear joint responsibility."61 The Executive Committee's 2000
treatment of the legality of interception policies was cautious. This Note pushes
that treatment forward, joining a body of scholarly work that seeks to explain
that non-entrde policies can and do violate the principle of non-refoulement,
even when such policies are implemented in the name of protecting national
security.
The Refugee Convention was designed as a functional compromise based
on international cooperation.62 The immediate neighbors of the country in
crisis-disproportionately poorer, developing countries-were to keep their
borders open; in return, more distant, richer countries would provide funding to
support the refugees in the near term and create resettlement places to integrate
the refugees into society in the long term.63 But the cooperative system has
broken down. Developed countries are not shouldering their share of the
resettlement burden.6"
The Syrian refugee crisis exhibits this pattern. Despite all the media
discussion about the "flood" of Syrian refugees into Europe,65 the European
Union is not bearing the brunt of the crisis. Germany, for example, received
173,100 applications for asylum during 2014.66 In the same year, Turkey hosted
one million refugees, the most of any country in the world. 67 Lebanon and
Jordan currently host the world's third and sixth largest refugee populations,
respectively, in spite of being comparatively tiny in terms of population. 68 And
while the United States leads the world in resettling refugees, its total of
73,000-even when combined with the 121,200 submitted claims for asylum-
pales in comparison.6 9
This disproportionate statistical picture is, by and large, the result of the
Global North's use of non-entrde measures. A Syrian refugee who wishes to
leave Turkey cannot simply board a plane to New York; even if she has the
funds, she does not have the paperwork required to pass through immigration.
She might try to travel by car, foot, or boat to Greece or Bulgaria, but if border
patrols catch her, she will be turned back. She can apply for refugee status with
the UNHCR and hope her application is submitted for resettlement, but she
probably hopes in vain; less than one percent of refugees "of concern to
61. Id.¶ 22.
62. See Refugee Convention, supra note 38, Preamble.
63. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Stephen Poellot, The Responsibility to Solve: The
International Community and Protracted Refugee Situations, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 195 (2014).
64. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 25, at 242.
65. See, e.g., Dan Harris & Jackie Jesko, Anti-Immigrant Protests Grow as Thousands of
Refugees Flood Europe, ABC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/anti-
immigrant-protests-grow-thousands-refugees-flood-europe/story?id=35888428; Alastair MacDonald,
E.U. Talks Tough on Deportations Amid Flood of Syrian Refugees, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-idUSKCNOS120E20151007.
66. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, WORLD AT WAR: GLOBAL TRENDS, FORCED
DISPLACEMENT IN 2014, at 3 (2015), www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html.
67. Id. at 11-12.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 3.
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UNHCR" are referred for resettlement each year. 70 These systems-visa
controls, border patrols, providing few or no spaces for resettlement-are all
examples of non-entre policies.7 '
Importantly, not all such systems are illegal. Greece, for instance, does
not violate the Refugee Convention by requiring visas for entry. But
interception programs, which catch refugees before they can cross a border and
claim the rights to which they should be due, are uniquely problematic under
the system envisioned by the authors and implementers of the Refugee
Convention.
II. THE TREATY DRAFTERS' BARGAIN: OPEN BORDERS IN RETURN FOR
ASSISTANCE AND LATER ADMISSION
This Part asks two critical questions about non-entrie systems. First, is it
possible for non-entrie systems-and in particular, interception programs-to
rise to such a level that they amount to refoulement? And second, if so, is the
general invocation of national security concerns sufficient to bring that
refoulement within the Article 33(2) exception?
Section II.A demonstrates that the plain text of the Refugee Convention is
insufficient to answer either of these questions. Sections II.B, II.C, and II.D use
alternate sources of treaty interpretation to explain that refusal to admit can
amount to refoulement and emphasize the very narrow intended scope of the
Article 33(2) exception. As this Part shows, the Refugee Convention was
designed to protect uniquely vulnerable populations of refugees by balancing
the interests of initial reception countries with more distant resettlement
countries. The Convention put in place a cooperative system under which these
countries would work together to offer refugees homes. Refusing to work
cooperatively toward admission violates this central principle. The national
security exception was to be construed narrowly-not read so widely that it
could risk dismantling the entire edifice of the Convention.
A. Legality ofNational Security-Based Non-Entrde Policies is Ambiguous
Under the Ordinary Meaning ofArticle 33
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which lays
out the definitive rules of treaty interpretation, the first step in answering any
question about the meaning of a treaty provision is its ordinary meaning. 72 The
relevant phrase when interpreting non-refoulement is, of course, Article 33(1),
which forbids any state to "expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever."7 3 The national security exception declares that "the present
provision . . . may not . . . be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he
70. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, Resettlement: A New Beginning in a Third Country,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4al6bl676.html.
71. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 25, at 241.
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31(1).
73. Id. art. 33(1).
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is." 74 The ordinary meaning of the second provision is thus dependent on the
ordinary meaning of the first-and flaws in the ordinary meaning of the first
are readily apparent. Both "expel or return ('refouler') . . . in any manner
whatsoever" and "reasonable grounds" are unhelpfully ambiguous.
A tragic historic example, one which predates the Refugee Convention
itself, helps us show how non-entrde policies have the potential to constitute
refoulement. In 1939, 907 Jews fled the Third Reich aboard the M.S. St. Louis.
After the Cuban authorities forbid them from disembarking, the U.S.
government denied them access to the New York Harbor.75 The ship had no
option but to return to Europe, where 254 of its passengers died during the
Holocaust-most of them in Auschwitz and Sobib6r. 76
The Refugee Convention was enacted in the wake of World War II to
protect people just like the Jews on the St. Louis.77 But if the Refugee
Convention had been in place in 1939, would it have forbidden the United
States' actions? Technically, denying access to the harbor was a particularly
blatant non-entree decision, not refoulement. Upon return to Europe, the Jews'
lives were threatened on account of their race-but the U.S. government at
least has a claim that it did not "expel" or "return" them to Germany. Yet if
Article 33's language prohibiting return "in any manner whatsoever" does not
prohibit this treatment of the Jews on the St. Louis, it is meaningless.
As such, the view that non-refoulement extends at least as far as the
country's borders has been universally accepted. The UNHCR is clear on this
in its own publications.79 The same understanding is reflected in the European
Court's decision in Hirsi Jamaaso and in the United States Supreme Court's
acknowledgment in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council that refugee protection
under U.S. domestic law extends to refugees who have reached the border.8 '
However, the text of the Refugee Convention contains no explicit right of
74. Id. art. 33(2).
75. See IRVING ABELLA & HAROLD TROPER, NONE IS Too MANY: CANADA AND THE JEWS OF
EUROPE, 1933-1948, at 63-64 (2000).
76. See SARAH A. OGILVIE & ScoTT MILLER, REFUGE DENIED: THE ST. Louis PASSENGERS
AND THE HOLOCAUST 174 (2006); see also id., at 63-64; Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 32(b).
77. Before the addition of the 1967 Protocol, the Refugee Convention applied only to those
who had a fear of persecution "[als a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951," and signatories
were given the option of further limiting its impact to events "occurring in Europe" in the same date
range-a euphemism for those persecuted by the Third Reich. Refugee Convention, supra note 38, art.
I.
78. See HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 315 & n.177 (citing UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 6, "Non-Refoulement" (1977), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c43ac.html; Gregor Noll et
al., Study on the Feasibility of Processing Asylum Claims Outside the EU Against the Background of the
Common European Asylum System and the Goal of a Common Asylum Procedure, DANISH CTR. FOR
HUM. RTS. 36 (2002); Penelope Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 661 (2002)). Because of this illogical result, there is also an argument that Article 32(b)
of the Vienna Convention, which allows recourse to supplementary methods of treaty interpretation
where the ordinary meaning "[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable," should be
invoked.
79. See, e.g., Executive Committee, supra note 60, ¶ 21.
80. See infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
81. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 160 (1993) (noting that provisions of
the INA forbidding refoulement protection apply only to "aliens who reside in or have arrived at the
border of the United States").
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admission, at the border or otherwise-only the Article 33 prohibition on
refoulement. The "ordinary meaning" of "expel or return (refouler) . . . in any
manner whatsoever" has already been expanded. The question that remains is
how much further it must go.
Imagine that the U.S. Coast Guard had intercepted the St. Louis and
turned it around in international waters, rather than at the entrance of the New
York Harbor. The immediate moral intuition is that this action is equally wrong
and should be equally prohibited. But the ordinary meaning of the Refugee
Convention provides no assistance in deciding where to draw that line.
With respect to the national security exception, the ordinary meaning of
"reasonable grounds" is similarly ambiguous. This ambiguity is evident in the
different treatments the phrase has received in different courts. The German
domestic courts, for example, have been clear that the grounds for exclusion
derived from Article 33(2) cannot be invoked unless a specific individual is
shown to have "a share of the responsibility for the acts committed by the
organisation." 82 However, the U.S. federal appellate courts have upheld the
material support provision, which requires no such showing, arguing that it
"adheres to [the Refugee Convention and Protocol's] specific non-refoulement
exception." 83 While the simple fact that two courts do not agree is not enough
to definitively prove that the text is ambiguous, the disagreement opens the
door for further, in-depth analysis. 84
Since the "ordinary meaning" of Article 33 is ambiguous as to the breadth
of the admission requirement and may be ambiguous as to the nature of the
national security exception, this Part will turn to supplementary methods of
treaty interpretation to clarify the meanings of the two sections. Following the
Vienna Convention, I look in turn to the treaty's "object and purpose,"85 to
"subsequent practice in the application of the treaty," 86 and finally, to "the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion."87
B. Object and Purpose and Subsequent Practice Are ofLimited Use in
Interpreting the Scope ofRefoulement
The Refugee Convention's object and purpose are not clearly stated in its
text, although its preamble provides some hints.88 According to the UNHCR, a
"close reading of the preamble leads to the conclusion that the object and
purpose of the [Refugee Convention] is to ensure the protection of the specific
82. Joined Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09, Fed. Republic of Ger. v. B & D, 2010 E.C.R. I-000, ¶
95.
83. Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 784 (9th Cir. 2009).
84. See HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 60 ("[T]here is quite a low threshold for deeming the
text of a treaty to be ambiguous or obscure.").
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 3 1(1).
86. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
87. Id. art. 32. Note that the treaty interpretation in this Part will focus exclusively on the
Refugee Convention, rather than the 1967 Protocol. The Protocol expanded the time frame of the
definition of refugee but added no new substantive rights to the international legal regime.
88. The Vienna Convention specifically notes that the preamble to a treaty is one of the
sources of context for treaty interpretation. Id. art. 31(2).
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rights of refugees, to encourage international cooperation in that regard . .. and
to prevent the refugee problem from becoming a cause of tensions between
states."89 Others disagree slightly on the wording, but not on the sentiment. 90
Here, it suffices simply to note that the Refugee Convention aims to give
rights to refugees. Given that the prohibition on refoulement is universally
recognized as a central provision of the Convention, any reading of the
prohibition which undermines refugee rights is immediately suspect. As
Hathaway put it, "[I]f states were able with impunity to reach out beyond their
borders to force refugees back to the risk of being persecuted . . . the entire
Refugee Convention-which is predicated on the ability of refugees to invoke
rights of protection in state parties-could, as a practical matter, be rendered
nugatory." 1 The same is true if states needed only to declare that security risks
exist to make such a move. While this object-and-purpose analysis affirms that
refoulement cannot be strictly limited to only state action within a country's
borders, it cannot prove how far refoulement can be extended. One could argue
that refugees' rights would be better protected if, for example, the United States
invaded Syria or if Turkey became a member of the European Union, but the
Refugee Convention cannot oblige either action.
Next, the Vienna Convention requires that treaty interpretation take into
account "[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 92 This
careful phrasing makes clear that the goal of the inquiry is not to catalog all
practices by all parties to a treaty. Rather, it is important to consider only
practice which "establishes the agreement of the parties." For multilateral
treaties, this is a high bar.93 The simple fact that the United States and the EU
have at various points in recent history considered themselves obligated to
admit large numbers of refugees or felt free to establish non-entre policies do
not establish agreement. It might be relevant that most of the countries in the
Global North are now participants in a network of non-entre policies, if such
policies were shown to be consistent and concordant.94 But that fact is of
dubious importance when countries in the Global South, which are
disproportionately burdened by the job of hosting refugees, are still calling on
their richer counterparts to take more of the burden.95 "Less-than-unanimous
state practice is at best an awkward source of guidance on the meaning of
89. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Interpreting Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status ofRefugees, 20 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 77 (2001).
90. See, e.g., KEES WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION
FROM REFOULEMENT 35 (2009).
91. HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 163-64.
92. Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31(3)(b).
93. See RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION § 4.3.3 (2d ed. 2015) ("The
interpretative value of subsequent practice, which by definition is not a formal, textual agreement, is
wholly dependent on the practice being concordant, the agreement being that of all parties and the
resultant interpretation being a single autonomous one.")
94. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 25.
95. See, e.g., Queen Rania 's Speech at the Walther Rathenau Prize Ceremony - Berlin,
QUEEN RANIA MEDIA CTR. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.queenrania.jo/en/media/speeches/queen-ranias-
speech-walther-rathenau-prize-ceremony-berlin.
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multilateral treaties," 96 and concordant practice among wealthy countries is
insufficient to prove agreement among all the parties to the Refugee
Convention.
As to the universality of employing security-based justifications, even
countries in the Global South which host large numbers of refugees express
concerns about national security in their decisions to admit, deny, or return
refugees. In January 2016, media outlets estimated that 16,000 Syrian refugees
were waiting at the Jordanian border, refused admission because of the
government's concerns that they had been infiltrated by ISIS.17 In 2015, in the
wake of a mass shooting at a Kenyan university, Kenya gave the United
Nations three months to move the Dadaab refugee camp across the border into
Somalia, citing concerns about fighters hiding in the camp.98 These types of
episodes may serve as evidence of a consistent practice of taking national
security concerns into account in processing refugees. This minimal level of
agreement would likely be uncontroversial, but it also proves unhelpful in
defining the limits of the obligation to admit. Any such obligation could not be
a blanket rule that all refugees must be admitted at all times regardless of
security concerns.
It might be that a more in-depth analysis of state practice could define
particular principles that are universally accepted and could usefully define the
intended breadth of the obligation to admit, the national security exception, or
both. Such an analysis has not, to my knowledge, been done, and it would be
beyond the scope of this Note to embark on it here. The available evidence of
state practice shows only that an obligation to admit can never be absolute and
that, at a minimum, states must be able to consider national security in denying
entrance to individuals. While both of these propositions are correct, they do
not helpfully advance the debate.
C. The Travaux Prdparatoires Clarify that the Goal Is Collaboration To
Admit, Not Collaboration To Deny
Under the Vienna Convention, when plain text, object and purpose, and
subsequent practice all prove insufficient to clarify the nature of a provision,
the next step is looking to the "preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion."99 The Refugee Convention did not emerge out
of a vacuum. In the search to determine the nature of the obligation to admit
and the national security exception, the first step will be to find which of the
reams of papers left by the Convention drafters are most critical to develop an
understanding of their intentions and circumstances. To that end, this Section
96. HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 73.
97. See Emma Gatten, Jordan Blocks Syria Border Leaving Thousands of Refugees in the
Desert-Including Hundreds of Pregnant Women, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/jordan-blocks-syrian-border-to-leave-thousands-
of-refugees-trapped-in-the-desert-including-hundreds-a682847 I.html.
98. See Kenya Orders UN To Move Massive Somali Refugee Camp, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 11,
2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/04/kenya-orders-move-massive-somali-refugee-
camp-150411190428267.htmi.
99. Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 32.
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proceeds chronologically through the three main events in the drafting of the
Refugee Convention, analyzing first its foundational documents, second the
committee drafting decisions, and third the final conference's ratification
debates.
Only two scholars have reviewed the portions of the Refugee
Convention's travaux prdparatoires dealing with Article 33. First, Paul Weis
wrote the general commentary on the collected travaux, including in the
commentary his broad conclusions on the nature of refoulement and its
exceptions.'"0 Second, James Hathaway analyzed various sections of the
travaux in his explanation of the reach of Article 33.11 To those two works,
this Note adds a systematic, national-security-centered view of the development
of the two provisions at hand.
1. Convention Circumstances: Confronting the Problem of
Statelessness
From its earliest stages, the Refugee Convention was designed to
decrease the number of refugees by increasing international cooperation. Entry
was assumed but not the center of debate. In 1948, the Economic and Social
Council commissioned a "study of the existing situation in regard to the
protection of stateless persons."'02 The resulting report, A Study of
Statelessness, is considered a "key document in the modem history of
international protection of refugees," already containing the "main elements of
the 1951 Convention."l 03 The study concludes that the phenomenon of illegal
entry may only be solved through international cooperation, by "encouraging
the appropriate distribution of stateless persons and by that very fact making
their presence less burdensome."" The focus on cooperation among reception
countries to admit refugees is in the DNA of the Refugee Convention, there
from its earliest conception.
To the extent the study is concerned with admission, it is only in the
context of "reduc[ing] the number of existing stateless persons by giving them
a nationality or restoring it to them, after permitting them to settle in a country
and integrating them in its national life." 05 Where travel and the right to entry
are mentioned, it is usually in the context of providing documents to stateless
100. See PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES
ANALYSED (1995).
101. HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 300-35.
102. Economic and Social Council Res. 116(VI)D (Mar. 1-2, 1948).
103. Gilbert Jaeger, On the History of the International Protection of Refugees, 83 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 727, 733-34 (2001).
104. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS 20 (1949).
The category of "stateless persons" includes many individuals who would currently be called refugees.
According to the Study, "[Riefugees are . .. de facto stateless persons if without having been deprived of
their nationality they no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their national authorities." Id. at 9.
But it assumed that all the stateless refugees who needed to be considered already existed. The study
declared that statelessness "resulted from the Nazi and Fascist regimes [and] disappeared with their
fall." Id. at 150.
105. Id. at 12.
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persons. 106 The vast majority of the study, like the vast majority of the Refugee
Convention, is devoted to improving conditions for affected individuals already
in a state's territory. Because of this focus on in-country conditions, it is not
surprising that the Secretary-General's accompanying recommendations focus
on discrimination and the provision of legal status, rather than admission,
expulsion, or refoulement.10 7 Admission had already happened, and entry was
assumed.
National security, by contrast, was of minimal importance. The study
notes in passing that "[e]xpulsion and reconduction are universally recognized
measures of order and security" and expresses concern that the "desire to
guarantee order and security leads to the creation of outlaws." 0 The study
warns against using denationalization as a punishment. 109 The dual
rationalizations of national security and public order are periodically invoked
but never examined in any detail. The study does not usefully explain the
breadth of the national security exception.
In the period from the composition of the study in 1948 to the passage of
the Refugee Convention in July 1951,110 the recognized refugee problem was
one of discrimination and assimilation, not of denied entry. As the Secretary-
General noted in his recommendations to the drafting committee, the proposed
changes "will herald a new phase of the refugee problem. This will be a
phase of the settlement and assimilation of the refugees.""'
This is not to say, of course, that admission was not considered in the
course of the debates about the Refugee Convention. The treaty drafters drew
heavily from the 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of
Refugees, a League of Nations convention dealing with the rights of Russian
and Armenian refugees." 2 Article 3 of the 1933 Convention provided:
106. See id. at 54.
107. Id. at 73.
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 159.
110. In 1949, armed with the results of the study, the U.N. Economic and Social Council
appointed the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems to "consider the desirability of
preparing a revised and consolidated convention relating to the international status of refugees and
stateless persons and, if they consider such a course desirable, draft the text of such a convention."
Economic and Social Council Res. 248 (IX) B (Aug. 8, 1949). The Secretary-General then furnished the
Ad Hoc Committee with a memorandum on the recommended outlines of the new convention, including
in its annex a draft convention. Memorandum from the Secretary-General to the Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/2
(Jan. 3, 1950) [hereinafter Memorandum from the Secretary-General to the Ad Hoc Committee],
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c280.html. Soon after, the Ad Hoc Committee circulated a report that
included another draft convention which would serve as the basis for the committee's drafting debates.
Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, U.N. Doc. E/1618, at 61 (1950),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40aal5374.html. The Committee's first session was held in New York in
January and February of 1950; its second session took place in Geneva in August of the same year. See
WEIS, supra note 100, at 2-3. The Economic and Social Council accepted the Ad Hoc Committee's draft,
the General Assembly convened a Conference of Plenipotentiaries to finalize the Convention, and, in
July 1951, the Conference adopted the final text of the Refugee Convention. See Goodwin-Gill, supra
note 41.
111. Memorandum from the Secretary-General to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note I10.
112. Convention of 28 October, 1933 relating to the International Status of Refugees, 159
U.N.T.S 3663 [hereinafter 1933 Convention]. The 1933 Convention was ratified by nine countries,
including France and the United Kingdom. See Jaeger, supra note 103, at 730.
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Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territory
by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorised to reside there regularly,
unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or public order.
It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their
countries of origin. 113
Under the 1933 Convention, admission was required.
In the Secretary-General's draft convention, he made clear that he hoped
to expand the right of entry even further. His draft Article III provided that the
"High Contracting Parties shall to the fullest possible extent relieve the burden
assumed by initial reception countries which have afforded asylum to [refugees
seeking asylum]. They shall do so, inter alia, by agreeing to receive a certain
number of refugees in their territory."" 4 The commentary attached to this
Article elaborated on the nature of the right that was contemplated:
Owing to their geographical position and liberal traditions, some States are destined
to become the initial reception countries for refugees. It is but just that other
countries should not allow these to bear the whole burden and by agreeing to admit
a certain number of refugees to their territory should assume their equitable share.
Clearly no binding and precise obligations can be imposed on Governments - for
example by specifying the extent to which they must agree to receive refugees on
their territory. It is for this reason that the Article includes the deliberately vague
form of words: "a certain number of refugees."l '5
The Secretary-General's framing of the issue animated the committee's debates
over what would become Article 33. Members of the drafting committee would
come to identify themselves as initial reception countries or resettlement
countries. In trying to reach a workable compromise between the two groups,
however, the article requiring admission foundered.
2. Drafting Decisions: Considering an Article Requiring
Admission
The Ad Hoc Committee devoted two hours on the morning of January 23,
1950, to discussing the possibility of introducing an article on admission. In
that morning's debate, the continental Europeans-representing that era's
initial reception countries-emerged as the champions of the requirement for
admission. In the words of the French representative, "The provisions on the
admission of refugees embodied the essence of international policy with regard
to refugees.""' The Belgian and Danish representatives agreed." 7
No one present at the meeting expressed disagreement with the spirit of
the proposed article-but the resettlement countries quibbled with its
placement. As the Brazilian representative put it, the "only disagreement
113. 1933 Convention, supra note 112, art. 3 (emphases added).
114. Memorandum from the Secretary-General to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 110.
115. Id.
116. Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees and Stateless Persons, 1st Sess., 7th mtg. ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.7 (Jan. 23, 1950).
117. Id.¶¶30,47.
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seemed to be on a purely technical matter: where and how the principle in
question should be stated.""' The strongest statement against including a
requirement for admission in the Refugee Convention was voiced by the U.S.
representative, who maintained that the "convention dealt with refugees who
had already been granted asylum and with their legal protection. The admission
of refugees, however, was connected with the problem of assistance, which was
not part of the Committee's business.""1 9 In the end, the participants voted six
to three with two abstentions not to include an article on admission.120
The U.S. representative's view that admission was not relevant to the
Convention did not take the day. As the Committee Chairman noted, the "vote
only excluded the clause from the operative part of the convention, and .. . the
Committee would subsequently have to find another place for it, either in the
preamble or in a resolution of the General Assembly."l 21 This was precisely
what happened. By the time the question of admission reached the Conference
of Plenipotentiaries, it had morphed into a unanimously adopted
recommendation that "Governments continue to receive refugees in their
territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international co-
operation in order that these refugees may find asylum and the possibility of
resettlement."' 2 2 The treaty adopters were not rejecting the argument for
admission. The parties involved were concerned that an article requiring
admission in the body of the Convention would be over-read and difficult to
enforce. The ethos of admission and the drive to find paths for cooperation
between initial reception countries and resettlement countries remained an
animating principle.
One might argue that because the Committee considered and rejected an
admission requirement, no obligation to admit can ever be read into Article 33.
This is true in two limited senses. First, Article 33 does not and cannot be read
to require states to admit all refugees who reach or attempt to reach their
borders. And second, Article 33 does not require states to admit any set number
of refugees. But the Committee was clear that admission of refugees was
critical to the success of the treaty's framework of refugee rights. Admission
was included in the framing of the Convention, just as it has been included in
judicial interpretations of the Convention's application to border admissions,1 23
because it was necessary for a system of refugee rights to exist at all.
The summary of the Ad Hoc Committee's debates on Article 28, which
would eventually be re-numbered to Article 33, was succinct and to the point:
"While some question was raised as to the possibility of exceptions to Article





122. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1 (July 25, 1951).
123. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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fundamental and that it should not be impaired." 24 The Committee believed the
issue of return was fundamental, and simply debated-exactly as this Note will
continue to do-under what circumstances admission might be necessary.
3. Ratification Debates: Explaining the Contours ofNon-
Refoulement and the National Security Exception
It is in the context of this appreciation of the general principle in favor of
admission that the national security exceptions which would become Article
33(2) should be read. The Ad Hoc Committee's proposed article on non-
refoulement had no national security exception.1 25 It was only at the latest
possible stage, during the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, that France and the
United Kingdom introduced a draft amendment to Article 28 that would
become the national security exceptions.' 26 On the same day, Sweden
introduced a similar amendment.' 2 7 When debate over the proposed
amendments began, the Canadian representative reminded the Conference that
the Ad Hoc Committee
had regarded article 28 as of fundamental importance to the Convention as a whole.
In drafting it, members of that Committee had kept their eyes on the stars but their
feet on the ground. Since that time, however, the international situation had
deteriorated, and it must be recognized, albeit with reluctance, that at present many
governments would find difficulty in accepting unconditionally the principle
embodied in article 28.128
It is unclear what this deterioration was, but two likely candidates
emerge. First, between the publication of the final report of the Ad Hoc
Committee in August 1950 and the introduction of these amendments in July
1951, the Korean War had hardened into an international crisis and begun to
produce large numbers of refugees.1 29 Second, in April 1951, Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg were sentenced to death for espionage.' 30 Regardless of the precise
historical event that occasioned this change in opinion, by 1951, only the
representatives from Switzerland and the Holy See voiced support for an
unamended version of Article 28.131 The British representative captured the
mood of the room most succinctly when he stated, "Among the great mass of
refugees it was inevitable that some persons should be tempted to engage in
activities on behalf of a foreign Power against the country of their asylum, and
124. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess. ¶ 30, U.N.
Doe. E/1850 (Aug. 25, 1950).
125. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, supra note 110,
at 23.
126. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, France/United Kingdom: Amendment to Article 28, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.2/69 (July 11, 1951).
127. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Sweden: Amendment to Article 28, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/70 (July 11, 1951).
128. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16 (Nov. 23, 1951).
The U.K. representative made a similar statement at the same meeting. Id.
129. See Sahr Conway-Linz, Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in
the Korean War, 29 D[PLOMATIC HIST. 49 (2005).
130. See William R. Conklin, Atom Spy Couple Sentenced to Die; Aide Gets 30 Years, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 6, 1951), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/generallonthisday/big/0405.html#article.
131. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 16th mtg., supra note 128.
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it would be unreasonable to expect the latter not to safeguard itself against such
a contingency."' 32 No further elaboration was provided as to the nature of the
national security threat envisaged by the first portion of the amendment.133
In clarifying the breadth of the admission requirement, the initial
reception countries once again took the stage, just as they had in the
committee's drafting debates. The Swiss representative noted during the
debates that, when large-scale migrations of refugees occur, all contracting
states will have to assist the overburdened initial reception countries by
agreeing to resettle some of the arriving refugees, lest a small country's very
existence be threatened.1 34 The Swiss representative was concerned about
requiring admission in the initial reception countries, worried that countries
next door to war zones might be forced to accept more refugees than they could
hold. He called on resettlement countries to assist the overburdened initial
reception countries. In the final meeting before the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries adjourned, the representative from the Netherlands brought up
what he called the "Swiss interpretation," declaring that he "wished to have it
placed on record that the Conference was in agreement with the interpretation
that the possibility of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass
migrations was not covered by article 33 ."135 Some commentators have
interpreted this reading into the record too generously, saying that it means
admission is not necessarily required.1 36 But its context must be understood.
The Swiss representative spoke for initial reception countries whose very
existence was threatened by floods of refugees, demanding that resettlement
countries work with them to counter that existential threat. The Swiss
interpretation does mean that when a state's very existence is called into doubt
because of the number of refugees entering, it may refuse them. But it also
means that resettlement countries must share the burden of providing homes for
refugees before they become such a threat.
Commentator Paul Weis drew two relevant conclusions from his analysis
of the Convention's travaux. First, Weis noted that the "words 'in any manner
whatsoever' would seem to indicate that" Article 33(1) "applied to non-
admittance at the frontier."' 37 Second, he concluded that Article 33(2) "has, like
all exceptions, to be interpreted restrictively. Not every reason of national
security may be invoked[;] the refugee must constitute a danger to the national
security of the country." 38 The national security exceptions were introduced
only belatedly and intended to be read as a specific national safeguard to allow
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 3rd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (July 3, 1951)
("Toutefbis, la delegation suisse pense qu'il va sans dire que les Etats contractants devront s'engager d
se priter appui mutuellement et d aider leur pays ou pbndtrerait une masse de refugids en raison de sa
situation gbographique, en prenant chez eux certains de ces rifugies. 11 tombe sous le sens qu'un petit
pays ne saurait accepter un nombre illimit de refugibs sans mettre en danger son existence.")
135. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 35th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.35 (Dec. 3, 1951),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68ceb4.html.
136. See, e.g., WEIS, supra note 100, at 342.
137. Id.at341.
138. Id. at 342.
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removal of those who threatened the "country of their asylum," 3 9 not to allow
for broad-based refusal to give access to asylum proceedings.
There are further conclusions to be drawn in the specific context of this
Note. The treaty drafters assumed that receiving refugees into states' territories,
while not a binding obligation as to any individual refugee, was a governing
principle that animated the spirit of the treaty itself. In addition, while the
precise way in which non-refoulement obligations were intended to function in
the context of mass migrations was the subject of some debate, the core
concern voiced by initial reception countries was desire for reassurance that
larger and more distant countries would be required to assist in situations that
threatened to overwhelm them.
It should be emphasized that the addition of Article 33(2) makes clear that
any obligation to admit cannot ever be absolute. No state is required to admit
refugees who it reasonably believes to be, for example, planning terrorist
attacks within its borders. States may have border fences, visa requirements,
and background checks. While arguably non-entrde policies, they are
legitimately and intimately related to the security interests Article 33(2) seeks
to protect. But neither can a state seize upon Article 33(2) and declare it may
intercept refugees abroad because they are, categorically, security risks. As the
"Swiss interpretation" makes clear, the premise of the two clauses of Article 33
is that states will work with one another to relieve the burden on initial
reception countries. When states instead work with one another to ensure no
refugees may leave the initial reception countries-whether national security is
invoked as a justification or not-the agreement is broken.
D. Assuming Entry in Early Practice
Analysis of the international community's response to the Hungarian
refugee crisis of 1956, the first large-scale refugee crisis handled under the
auspices of the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR, confirms this reading.1 40
Over the course of only a few months in late 1956 and early 1957, 200,000
refugees fled from Hungary into Austria and Yugoslavia.141 The first weekend
in November alone, 10,000 people crossed the Austrian border.1 42 A week after
the first refugees began arriving, the Austrian interior minister sent a telegram
to the UNHCR requesting financial assistance and aid in securing
resettlement.1 43 Resettlement began two days later,'" and 100,000 people were
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
140. See Rupert Colville, "A Matter of the Heart": How the Hungarian Crisis Changed the
World of Refugees, 144 REFUGEES 4, 9 (2006); Marjoleine Zieck, The 1956 Hungarian Refugee
Emergency, an Early and Instructive Case of Resettlement, 5 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 45, 46 (2013).
141. See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1957, at 232 (1958); Zieck, supra note 140, at
49.
142. See Colville, supra note 140, at 6.
143. Zieck, supra note 140, at 50-51.
144. See id at 49; see also Colville, supra note 140, at 9.
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resettled in the first ten weeks. 145 By the end of 1957, more than 160,000
refugees had been resettled. 146
In response to the crisis, receiving countries waived or sped up admission
procedures, sometimes requiring as little as three days from admission to
resettlement. 147 In the end, refugees were resettled in thirty-seven different
countries-almost half the countries that were then members of the United
Nations. 4 8 Admission and cooperation were the order of the day.
It would be an overstatement to say that the response to the Hungarian
refugee crisis was a perfect implementation of the admission and resettlement
scheme in the Refugee Convention. First, of the thirty-seven resettlement
countries, only seventeen had ratified the Convention as of October 1956.149
(All but one have since ratified the Convention, the Protocol, or both; the lone
holdout is Cuba. 50) And second, although admission was clearly the order of
the day, a number of countries were criticized for restrictive or discriminatory
admission criteria. Only a very few states indicated they would accept all
refugees who wished to travel there.'' By contrast, Portugal and Denmark, for
example, offered resettlement exclusively to mothers and children.1 52 And
while governments expressed concern about the possibility of Soviet spies
hiding among the masses,'15 the biggest concern of most resettlement countries
was that the refugees they took in should be productive members of the
economy. To this end, Austrian officials requested that other states "take not
only the young, the strong, the skilled, but also the lame, the sick, the
handicapped, the uneconomic families."' 54 Their request was largely, but not
entirely, successful. By the end of 1957, the Yearbook of United Nations
reported that "[a]pproximately 11,000 of the 19,000 [Hungarian refugees
remaining in Austria] either wished to remain in Austria or were considered
likely to do so through failing to meet the selection criteria of countries of
resettlement."' 5
In early practice, admission, though not automatic, was not a hotly
contested issue. National security was not a blanket excuse to dodge
145. Rupert Colville, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Hungarian Uprising and Refugee Crisis, U.N.
HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.unher.org/453c7adb2.html.
146. See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1957, supra note 141, at 233.
147. UNITED NATIONS, THE EXODUS FROM HUNGARY 10-12 (1957).
148. See Colville, supra note 140, at 10; Zieck, supra note 140, at 59-60.
149. The seventeen countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ecuador, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. For the dates that each country ratified the Refugee Convention, see Status of the
Refugee Convention, supra note 38.
150. See id.; see also Refugee Protocol, supra note 38. The Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland and the Union of South Africa each received Hungarian refugees for resettlement; their
present-day successor states, Zimbabwe and South Africa, have ratified the Refugee Convention.
151. See Zieck, supra note 140, at 55 (noting the willingness of France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Switzerland to accept all refugees).
152. Id.
153. Johanna Granville, OfSpies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria Dealt with
the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, 91 HiST. 62 (2006).
154. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 147, atl 1.
155. YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1957, supra note 141, at 233.
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resettlement. That the United States and the European Union have changed
their tunes in the last fifty years is perhaps unsurprising. European countries are
no longer initial reception countries, and modem refugees are not Europeans,
sharing a racial and cultural history with their destination countries. And
neither the United States nor the European Union has any interest in giving up
the control over migration policy built over the last several decades.156
III. A CASE STUDY IN CHALLENGING NON-ENTRkE POLICIES: EUROPE'S
ATTEMPTS TO BAR SYRIAN REFUGEES
The response to Hungary's crisis in 1956, the sort of international
cooperation envisioned in the travaux, is not the response refugees are
witnessing today. Rather than working together to admit as many refugees as
they safely can, countries in the Global North today have implemented
interception programs under which refugees may be stopped before they ever
arrive at their destination countries' borders, often in the name of protecting
national security.'5I
The foregoing analysis of the Refugee Convention's preparatory materials
and the earliest practice after it was drafted leads to two conclusions: first, that
admission was intended to be an animating principle of the Refugee
Convention, and second, that the national security exceptions were never
intended to sweep so broadly as to permit the wholesale barring of refugees.
Countries that have signed the Refugee Convention should not be permitted to
invoke broad national security arguments to avoid their responsibilities to admit
and care for refugees. This Part explains in further detail why and how those
policies violate international law and could be challenged in courts of law.
This Part picks out a single case study in the web of interception policies
Europe has put into place: the European Union's deal with Turkey to increase
border security on routes refugees travel. It explains that the deal is a
cooperative policy designed expressly to deny refugees the benefit of admission
into Europe, and shows how it could be challenged.
A. The European Union's Use of Turkey to Halt the Flow ofSyrian
Refugees
In 2014, Syrians crossed land and sea borders to file more asylum
petitions than Europe had received at any time in the previous twenty years,
and numbers rose even more in 2015.'15 The UNHCR estimated that between
April 2011 and December 2016, 1,177,914 Syrians applied for asylum in the
European Union.159
156. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Continuing Relevance of International Refugee Law in a
Globalized World, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REv. 25,32 (2015).
157. See supra notes 3-31 and accompanying text.
158. See Shekhar Aiyar et al., The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges, IM F 9-10
(Jan. 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdnl602.pdf
159. See Syria Regional Refugee Response, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
http://data.unher.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Meanwhile, more than 4.7 million Syrian refugees
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Responding to this increase, in October 2015, Turkey and the European
Union released a Joint Action Plan to "step up their cooperation on . . .
migration management in a coordinated effort to address the crisis created by
the situation in Syria."o60 Turkey agreed to increase humanitarian aid to
refugees, to "strengthen the interception capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard,"
and to "[s]tep up cooperation with Bulgarian and Greek authorities to prevent
irregular migration across the common land borders." 61 A month later, EU
leaders announced that they had agreed to pay Turkey US$3.23 billion to
support its efforts to increase border patrols and "stem[] the unprecedented
migration influx into Europe."l 62 In March 2016, the governments announced a
new policy to curb "illegal migration." 63 Under its terms, "[i]n order to break
the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to
putting their lives at risk," all "new irregular migrants" who crossed from
Turkey into Greece would be returned to Turkey; for each individual so
returned, "another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into
account the UN Vulnerability Criteria." 6"
Turkey has since been accused of a number of human rights violations,
including closing its border to Syrian refugees, killing and injuring Syrians at
the border, and illegally detaining and deporting refugees.' 65
Human rights advocacy groups have warned that that the EU-Turkey
agreement could make the European Union complicit in these and other human
rights violations committed by Turkey against refugees.1 ' As a matter of
international law, that sense of moral responsibility could translate into
illegality according to a number of different theories. First and most simply, it
may be the case that returning refugees to Turkey is itself either refoulement or
impermissibly degrading treatment."' Second, a refugee returned to Turkey
may in turn be removed to Syria or to another country where she faces
persecution, a process called "chain refoulement" and for which international
were registered in Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon during the same period. Id. Note that of
these countries, only Turkey and Egypt are parties to the Refugee Convention.
160. EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, EUR. COMM'N (Oct. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
releaseMEMO-1 5-5860_en.htm.
16 1. Id.
162. Pop, supra note 7.
163. Press Release, EU-Turkey Statement, supra note 9.
164. Id.
165. See Europe's Gatekeeper: Unlawful Detention and Deportation of Refugees from Turkey,
AMNESTY INT'L (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3022/2015/en; Turkey:
Border Guards Kill and Injure Asylum Seekers, HuM. RTS. WATCH (May 10, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/1 0/turkey-border-guards-kill-and-injure-asylum-seekers; Turkey:
Syrians Pushed Back at the Border, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015
/11/23/turkey-syrians-pushed-back-border.
166. See, e.g., Turkey: E. U. Risks Complicity in Violations as Refugees and Asylum-Seekers
Locked Up and Deported, AMNESTY INT'L (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news
/2015/12/turkey-eu-refugees-detention-deportation.
167. See Sergio Carrera et al., The EU's Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and
Setting Policy Priorities, CTR. FOR EUR. POL'Y STUD. 18 (Dec. 2015),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU%20Response%20to%20the%
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courts have assigned liability.168 The topic of this Note, however, is a third
theory of liability, designed to protect the refugees who were denied access to
Europe. But there is a jurisdictional problem that must be addressed before
such liability can be assigned.
B. Establishing Jurisdiction Over EU Actions Abroad
The diabolical brilliance of interception programs is that they occur
outside the reception country's borders. The EU-Turkey deal happens outside
Europe, such that European governments can plausibly deny responsibility for
what happens to those refugees. As this Section will show, though, courts are
already developing the tools to ensure that countries cannot simply operate at a
remove from the harms their policies create and disavow responsibility.
The UNHCR Executive Committee is quite clear that the "international
refugee protection regime would be rendered ineffective if States' agents
abroad were free to act at variance with obligations under international refugee
law and human rights law."1 69 But bringing a challenge on behalf of refugees
outside the destination country's borders faces a legal hurdle; the refugees
challenging the destination country's laws would not be physically present in
that country and so may be unable to claim the benefit of its legal obligations
and protections.
The problem is one of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in public international law
is not the harsh procedural bar that is familiar to U.S. civil procedure students;
it is a "remedial, as opposed to a substantive, notion of jurisdiction. Its function
is to ensure that breaches of the Convention are duly attributed to the relevant
contracting state and that therefore responsibility is assumed and remedies
implemented."o17 Jurisdiction is a matter of accountability. As the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) put it in determining South Africa's responsibility for
acts committed in Namibia, "South Africa, being responsible for having created
and maintained [this] situation . .. has the obligation to put an end to it. . . . It
also remains accountable for any violations of its international obligations, or
of the rights of the people of Namibia."17 '
The European Court of Human Rights has joined with the ICJ and other
international courts to create a thriving jurisprudence of jurisdiction. The
European Court's best-known doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction hinges on
the exercise of "effective control" over a foreign territory. According to the
European Court, effective control is "exceptional," occurring when, "as a
consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or
acquiescence of the Government of that territory, [a foreign State] exercises all
168. See, e.g., T.I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98, 2000-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 435.
169. Exec. Comm. of the U.N. High Comm'r on Refugees, supra note 60, 123.
170. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the
Recent Jurisprudence ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 529, 540 (2003).
171. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 118 (June 21); see also Coard et al. v. United States, Case No.
10.951, Inter-Am Comm'n H.R., Report No. 109/99, 37 (1999).
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or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government."1 72
For effective control to be found in the case of Syrian refugees, litigants would
have to show that, for example, EU assistance to Turkish security forces rises
to the level of exercising a government's public powers.
However, in the context of claims of extraterritorial refoulement, the
European Court has applied a less stringent test than the effective control
standard. The European Court has been clear that there is no requirement of
physical presence in an EU country in order to claim the benefit of non-
refoulement. In Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the European Court declared that when an
Italian ship intercepted refugees in international waters in order to return them,
that "constitute[d] a case of extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction
by Italy capable of engaging that State's responsibility under the
Convention." 7 3 The court based this finding of jurisdiction on the international
law principle that a " vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the State of the flag it is flying."' 74 Whether jurisdiction might
be similarly available to refugees on land in foreign countries is discussed
further below;'7 5 for now, it suffices to show that the simple fact that refugees
are outside their European destination country does not bar them from seeking
relief
C. The EU's Political Bargain to Bar Access Amounts to Aiding or
Assisting Refoulement
But to hold Europe responsible for intercepting refugees abroad, a court
would not only need to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements, but also to prove
that substantively, such interception violates Article 33.
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James Hathaway have provided the first
outlines of the path by which a country can be held accountable for the non-
entree bargains it strikes with another country.1 76 Their analysis begins with
Article 16 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State
does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act;
and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.1 77
They note that, while Article 16 is not formally binding, the ICJ
"consider[s] the article to be an expression of customary international law," 7 8
172. Bankovi6 v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2011-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 171.
173. Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, } 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012).
174. Id. at 177.
175. See infra Section Ill.C.
176. Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 25, at 276-82.
177. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 16, in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, A/56/20 (2001).
178. Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 25, at 277-78 (citing Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.), 2007
I.C.J. 43, 420 (Feb. 26)).
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the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has considered it applicable
when European states have contributed to refoulement,i7 9 and the European
Court of Human Rights similarly maintains that "international human rights
law is to be interpreted taking into account the law on state responsibility."'s
These courts and international bodies have used Article 16 to expand
jurisdiction over human rights violations, thereby implicating both the states
that commit the violations and the states that assist in such a violation.
Applying this Article to the principle of non-refoulement, Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Hathaway conclude that it is possible to hold destination states
liable for non-entre policies undertaken in coordination with other
governments:
[A] state which takes steps such as providing maritime patrol vessels or border
control equipment, which seconds border officials, or which shares relevant
intelligence or directly funds migration control efforts that assist another country to
breach its non-refoulement or other protection obligations is taking action that can
fairly be characterized as within the ambit of aiding or assisting."'
They do not conclude that implementing non-entrde policies inherently
aids or assists other countries in violating their non-refoulement obligations,
nor do they conclude that non-entre policies are inherently illegal. Rather,
they explain that certain types of non-entre policies may fall under the general
heading of aiding or assisting, and as such would be impermissible under
Article 16. This Section uses this framework to analyze the legality of the
European Union's arrangement with Turkey.
To begin, two background facts must be established. First, as previously
discussed, Syrians are considered by the UNHCR to be "likely to fulfil the
requirements" to be considered refugees under the terms of the Refugee
Convention.1 82 While this does not prove that all Syrians fleeing their country
are refugees from persecution, it does provide notice to the states involved that
the population should as a whole be given access to assistance and protection
until such time as certain individuals are shown not to meet the Convention's
definition. Second, as both Turkey and the member states of the European
Union are parties to the Refugee Convention and Protocol,1 83 for any of these
states to return refugees to face persecution would be an "internationally
wrongful act."
179. Id. at 278 (citing European Commission for Democracy Through the Law (Venice
Commission), On the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Members States in Respect
of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport Of Prisoners, Op. No. 363/2005, at 44-45
(2006), http://www.venice.coe.intlwebformsldocuments/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282006%29
009-e).
180. Id. (citing Jaloud v. Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08, 1 151 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 20,
2014); Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 1 84 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 7, 2011); Bankovic,
App. No 52207/99, at 1 57)).
181. Id. at 279.
182. International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab
Republic, Update III, supra note 15, I 21, 26.
183. See Status of the Refugee Convention, supra note 38; Status of the Refugee Protocol,
supra note 38.
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The next step in assigning the European Union responsibility under
Article 16 would be to prove first, that refoulement is actually occurring in
Turkey and second, that the European Union entered into or continued to
participate in the agreement in spite of knowledge of that refoulement. To
prove both of these, a court of law would need to perform a very detailed fact-
finding, requiring more resources and information than is publicly available at
this time. However, such a fact-finding would likely draw on the credible
accusations of human rights organizations that Turkey is committing
refoulement, accusations the EU leadership has almost certainly heard.1 84
Finally, Article 33(2) may not be invoked as a possible exception to the
rule of non-refoulement in these (or any similar) cases. As discussed in Part II,
the national security exceptions were envisioned as narrowly constrained and
only available for invocation after an individualized finding of a threat. They
were not intended or originally used in justifying large-scale admission or
deportation regimes like the Turkey-EU deal.
CONCLUSION
The countries of the European Union-like the United States and other
nations in the Global North--believe that their efforts to shield themselves
from the refugee crises are immune from challenge. This Note has shown that,
as a matter of international law, this is not the case. Refugees are entitled under
the Refugee Convention not to be returned to countries where they face
persecution, and the different, interlocking types of non-entrde systems detailed
in this Note risk precisely that result for Syrian refugees. Increased
militarization and patrolling of borders and coasts under EU mandates and
funding leaves many Syrian refugees with no choice but to remain in Turkey,
where they do not have access to real resettlement opportunities and risk
refoulement. The EU does not have an obligation to admit all refugees who
might wish to travel to their borders, but they do have an obligation not to
actively take non-entrde measures which, by intercepting refugees abroad, lead
to refoulement or which encourage other countries to commit refoulement.
The same is true of the other countries whose non-entr~e policies have
been mentioned only briefly in this Note. Australia's refusal to allow boats of
refugees to reach its waters is impermissible, and the United States' deal with
Mexico to stop Central American refugees may be similarly problematic.
Even those non-entree policies which are not explicit interception
programs may violate the framework discussed here. For example, the United
States' willingness to deny refugees entrance on national security grounds
without an individualized finding of threat is likely inconsistent with the spirit
of cooperation to admit that the travaux and early practice make clear is
necessary.' 85
I 84. See, e.g., Turkey: Illegal Mass Returns of Syrian Refugees Expose Fatal Flaws in EU-
Turkey Deal, AMNESTY INT'L (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/20 1 6/04/turkey-iIlegaI-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fataI-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal.
185. See Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 353-56 (4th Cir. 2012); Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d
773, 784 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Kristine A. Huskey, The US. "Material Support" Bar to Refugee
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The challenges to non-entre policies detailed in this Note are at the
cutting edge of international law. It will take time before domestic courts
accept the reasoning laid out here. And in the meantime, the Syrian refugee
crisis, and other, similarly tragic crises are ongoing. Refugee camps are in their
third generation. More refugees are living their lives without access to
resettlement opportunities than at any other point since the UNHCR was
founded. Challenges in courts are certainly an important avenue to challenge
the way those refugees are received and treated, but cases brought one by one
are too slow, too particular, and too resource-intensive to fix the enormous
problem.
In 1951, participants at the General Conference of Plenipotentiaries
believed the world was a more frightening place, more full of threats and
danger, than had been the case in 1950-but when tragedy struck five years
later in the form of the suppressed Hungarian Revolution, almost half the
countries in the United Nations stepped up to receive and resettle fleeing
refugees. In recent years, the European Union and other admission-denying
countries like Australia and the United States have shrunk into themselves,
erecting distant barriers and procedural mazes to protect themselves from the
threats of young and desperate families packed into over-crowded boats in the
Mediterranean. These were reflexive reactions to an emergent crisis, but they
should no longer be tolerated. The strategies they have employed are not
permissible under the Refugee Convention and it is time for the European
Union, the United States, and Australia to reverse course and to show the
Global North the way back.
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